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Misleading perceptions and economic efficiency 
in a regional system
This paper’s innovation is the introduction of a misper‑
ception effect to the core‑periphery model. Using a theo‑
retical model, we show that the free market will lead to 
distorted spatial distribution of firms between the core 
and the periphery when a misperception effect is intro‑
duced into the model. Based on a questionnaire, we found 
that a misperception regarding the quality of the produc‑
tion factor exists in favour of the core compared to the 
periphery. This misperception is found not only in the 
eyes of the core with regard to the periphery, but also in 
the periphery regarding itself. We suggest marketing and 
empowerment of the periphery as a policy tool to alter 
these misperceptions.
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1 Introduction
The geographical concentration of firms within a region is an 
important factor in both a region’s economic development and 
the regional inequality of income distribution. The tendency 
of spatial concentration has been analysed by many scholars, 
generally under the global title of the “core‑periphery” issue, 
and more recently under the theme of the “new economic 
geography” (NEG; see, e.g., Krugman, 1991; Baldwin, 2001; 
Lanaspa et al., 2001; Hu, 2002). Robert Helsley and William 
Strange  (1990), Masahisa Fujita and Hesham Abdel‑Rah‑
man (1993) and Dirk Dohse (1998) refer to market failure 
in the spatial location of economic activity. This market failure 
stems from firms’ failure to consider positive externalities (the 
marginal influence on the agglomeration advantage) and nega‑
tive externalities (the marginal influence on free‑market prices), 
yet these models do not refer to the extra social costs. Richard 
Baldwin and Philippe Martin (2004) add the effect of capital 
mobility to Paul Krugman’s (1991) model; they find that spa‑
tial concentration does occur, but it may be consistent with 
a process of delocation of firms towards poor regions. Firm 
location in certain regions mainly depends on the availability 
of production factors and their quality. Some of the most com‑
mon factors are the quality of the labour force, the quality of 
the infrastructure and positive (economics of scale) and nega‑
tive (prices) agglomeration effects (see Bar‑El & Felsenstein 
1990; Taylor, 1993; Wong, 1998; Yukichi & Keijiro, 2000; 
Hodgkinson et al., 2001).
In this paper we add to the NEG models the idea of misper‑
ception of the quality of production factors in the peripheral 
region in relation to the core region. Perceptions are affected 
only in part by physical reality, and are also based on well‑worn 
prejudices, desires and memories that take shape in the collec‑
tive memory (Kavaratzis, 2004). We suggest marketing as a 
policy tool to alter these misperceptions. Actually, marketing 
regions/cities has become a common policy tool in order to 
approve the image of a region (Paddison, 1993), thus promot‑
ing the economy of the region by attracting new investments 
to it (Kearns & Philo; 1993; Short et al., 1993). We first de‑
veloped a simplified model that shows the equilibrium spatial 
distribution of firms between the core and periphery, and then 
extended it by adding a perception factor to the analysis (this is 
based on Miki Malul and Raphael Bar‑El’s model; see Malul & 
Bar‑El 2009a, 2009b). After describing the theoretical model, 
we present an empirical analysis of the perception factors col‑
lected from a questionnaire given to the participants.
2  The basic model
The basis for our analysis is the model developed by Malul and 
Bar‑El (2009a, 2009b). We first describe the main principles of 
this model and then we add the perception effect to the model. 
For the sake of simplification, we assume that there are only 
two regions in the economy. A is a core region (a region with 
a high level of economic activity) and B is a peripheral region. 
The number of firms actually stands for the level of economic 
activity. At the starting point, the number of firms in region A 
is higher than in region B. We assume a perfectly competitive 
market in which each firm considers both region A and B 
for its location. The firm’s objective when making a decision 
to locate in region A or B is to maximise the Net Present 
Value (NPVj), which the firm sees under free market condi‑
tions, taking into consideration all the private benefits versus 
all the private costs. For analytical purposes, let us make the 
simplistic assumption that the NPV can be disaggregated into 
two parts: one part is determined by the specific technological 
factors of the firm or the sector, and the other part depends 
on location factors. Let NPVbasic represent that part of the 
NPV that is determined by the specific characteristics of the 
firm or the sector, such as production technology, production 
factors, and so on. Now, let ∑
=
t
i 1 NPVj(Xji) represent the other 
part of the NPV, which depends on location factors. It actually 
represents that part of the NPV that is attributable to regional 
factors, where Xji represents variables that affect the NPV and 
whose values are different in each region, such as prices, ag‑
glomeration, infrastructures and so on; i represents the index 
for each variable, I = 1 . . . t, and j represents the region index 
j = {A,B}. Therefore,
private
j NPV  = NPVbasic + ∑
=
t
i 1
NPVj(Xji).
For the sake of simplification, let us define Wi as the relative 
weight of influence of variable Xji.
Given that NPVbasic is identical for both regions, the firm as‑
pires to maximise the following expression:
ZPj = ∑
=
t
i 1
NPVj(Xji) = ∑
=
t
i 1
 Wi Xji ,
where ZPj is the “private score” of region j and reflects the 
contribution of the characteristics of region j to the NPV of any 
given firm in the region – that is, as perceived by the investors 
that have to make a location decision based on factors such as 
the influence of infrastructures in the region, the availability 
of a labour force, the distance from other regions, the cost 
of land and so on. The “private score” of region j therefore 
represents the economic benefits that can be gained by the 
firm as a consequence of the specific qualities of this region.
We normalise the value of each Xji in region B to 1, so that 
the value of the variable in region A reflects the relative ad‑
vantage of region A for each of the variables. We have selected 
five main factors that influence the score ZPj and divided them 
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into two groups: exogenous and endogenous. The exogenous 
factors are represented by variables that are assumed to be 
determined or at least heavily influenced by forces that are 
external to a free market, mainly those of public policy such 
as infrastructure quality, labour force quality and accessibility 
to central amenities. The endogenous factors are represented 
by variables that are determined for each region as a function 
of the number of firms in the region: agglomeration econo‑
mies  (PE) and prices of production factors  (PP). Agglom‑
eration economies (PE): it is assumed that an increase in the 
number of firms in a region increases agglomeration economies 
and as a result boosts the productivity of each firm in the re‑
gion (see Arnott, 1979; Henderson, 1983, 1986; Goldstein & 
Gronberg, 1986; Davis & Weinstein, 1999).
We define y as the ratio nA/nB, where nA and nB reflect the 
number of firms in regions A and B, respectively (as defined 
above, nA > nB). We also assume that the contribution of ag‑
glomeration economies increases at a decreasing rate, as rep‑
resented by the function:
PEA = (y)a, 0 < a < 1
where PEA indicates the relative advantage of region  A in 
relation to region B resulting from the positive effects of ag‑
glomeration.
Prices of production factors (PP): as the number of firms in 
the region rises, the prices (rents, monthly wages and prices of 
other production factors) in the region rise (see Mera 1973; 
Mitra 1999; Verhoef 2000). We assume that prices increase at 
an increasing rate, as represented by the following function:
PPA = (y)
p
y
β
) ( , βp > 1
where βp is the elasticity of prices in relation to the number of 
firms, defined as the percent change in price in relation to the 
percent change in the number of firms. Here the PPA stands 
for the relative prices in region A as compared to region B.
2.1  The market solution
We have shown that in a system with two regions, A and B, a 
free market leads to a finite ratio y. The score under free‑market 
conditions is defined for each region as:
Region A: ZPA = constA = WPE ya − Wpp y
p
y
β
Region B: ZPB = constB = WPE 1a − Wpp 1
p β
1 ,
where constj is determined by all exogenous variables (infra‑
structure quality, labour force quality and accessibility to 
central amenities) and it stands for the relative advantage 
of region A as compared to region B. WPE and WPP are the 
weights of the two parts in the NPV function (PE and PP).
Under free and competitive market conditions, the proportion 
between the number of firms in Region A and in Region B 
reaches equilibrium at yp, as can be seen in Figure 1. This ratio 
represents a stable system equilibrium (every shift from it will 
create an advantage for one of the regions, so that the firms will 
change their location towards equilibrium). The gap between 
the regions as represented by yp is a result of free‑market con‑
sideration when the firms consider the real attributes of each 
region (i.e., quality of labour force and quality of infrastruc‑
ture(. In Malul and Bar‑El (2009a) this equilibrium yp was 
analysed compared to the optimal ratio from a social point of 
view, where they added other factors such as congestion, pollu‑
tion and so on to the consideration of the real prices that stem 
from location in a certain region. They found that the optimal 
ratio should be lower than yp, and thus a market failure exists in 
the spatial distribution of firms. Malul and Bar‑El (2009b) ex‑
tended this model by adding a mobility of production factors 
between the regions. They found that reducing the mobility 
costs between the regions does not necessary solve the market 
failure that stems from the free market; however, it might de‑
crease the inequality in income (GNP) between the regions. In 
this paper we analyse the free‑market equilibrium compared to 
the equilibrium achieved when an erroneous perception about 
the scores of the regions is considered by firms.
2.2  The perception effect
We assume that perceptions of the gaps between the constants 
of the two regions are higher than the real gap between the 
regions  (specifically, that the perception of the constant is 
combined from the perception of the gap in the quality of 
the infrastructure, the labour‑force quality and accessibility to 
core amenities). Thus, if the perceptions are different than what 
is found in the real‑life situation, the modified relative score 
of the core region will be higher than the one that should be 
and was presented in the previous section.
The new scores of the two regions are:
Region A: ZPA = d * constA = WPE ya − Wpp y
p
y
β
Region B: ZPB = constB = WPE 1a − Wpp 1
p β
1 ,
where d reflects the perception factor and is larger than 1, 
saying that the perception is distorting the advantages toward 
the central region. Actually, for the previous private‑market 
solution this equation holds: ZPPA(yp) > ZPA(yp) = ZPB(yp).
As illustrated in Figure 1, the new free‑market equilibrium is 
ypp > yp and implies that the free market failed to achieve an 
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efficient spatial distribution of firms between the core and the 
periphery due to misperception of the “constant” in the core 
in relation to the periphery.
In the theoretical model we assumed that a misperception of 
the core region occurred in relation to the peripheral region 
when considering the quality of the production factor. The 
next section describes a questionnaire we administered in order 
to estimate the scope of this misperception.
3  Empirical estimation
In this section we try to estimate the parameter d, which meas‑
ures the differences between the real and perceived gap in the 
“constants” of each of the two regions. The “constant” mainly 
includes two factors: the quality of the labour force and the 
quality of infrastructure, which together constitute about 70% 
of the “constant” (Malul & Bar‑El, 2009a). The other 30% is 
the business environment, including the general business en‑
vironment, access to capital and crime levels (Israeli Ministry 
of Industry, Trade and Labor, 2005).
3.1  The questionnaire
The participants comprised 84 Israeli MBA students: 47 stu‑
dents (average age = 29.85) living and studying (at the College 
of Management) in the centre of Israel, and 37 students (aver‑
age age = 30.16) living and studying (at Ben‑Gurion Univer‑
sity) in the south of Israel. Due to the fact that some of the 
MBA students that participated in our sample are currently in 
managerial positions and others might obtain similar positions 
in the future, there is no reason to assume that using a different 
sample of managers would yield other results. The central re‑
gion is the core region (region A in the theoretical model) and 
the southern region is the peripheral region (region B in the 
theoretical model). The participants were asked to complete 
a questionnaire that included five parts. The participants were 
told that the questionnaire was anonymous and for research 
purposes only, but they were not informed of the purpose of 
the research or the hypotheses that were being tested.
In the first part of the questionnaire, the participants were 
asked to answer a number of demographic questions, such as 
age and gender. In the second part we gave the participants the 
Israeli average value of three measurable indicators – average 
salary, average years of studies and average crimes per 1,000 res‑
idents – and then asked them to estimate the regional value 
for each indicator. In the third part we asked the participants 
to scale the production‑factor qualities, infrastructure (roads 
and communication), labour‑force quality (labour force and 
education) and business environment (personal security and 
general human resources quality). In the fourth part of the 
questionnaire we evaluated the level of trust. Each participant 
was asked to rank on a scale of 1 to 7 his or her degree of 
trust in each of the following two populations: residents of 
the centre of the country and residents of the south (1 = very 
low trust, 7 = very high trust). In this section we also asked 
the subject to bid the maximum amount he or she would be 
willing to pay for two lotteries that give a 50% probability 
of winning 1,000 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) or 0 NIS.[1] In 
each lottery the participant faced one of two payers of the 
lottery’s outcome: either a resident of the centre or a resident 
of the south.
In the last part we evaluated the subjective time discount rate 
that each group faced. The basic economic theory concerning 
time discounting assumes that a subject facing the decision to 
postpone receipt of payment takes into consideration the time 
preferences of the payer but not his or her trust in the payer. 
However, Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1997: 1252) sug‑
gest that “economic activities that require some agents to rely 
on the future actions of others are accomplished at lower cost 
in a higher trust environment”. They found that trust has a 
significant impact on aggregate economic activity.
The participants were asked to state the amount (in NIS) they 
would be willing to accept (WTA) 24 months from today in 
order to postpone receipt of a fixed sum of 1,000 NIS they 
could receive today. In the first  question the future payer 
would be a resident of the south, and in the second question 
the future payer would be a resident of the centre. According 
to the implicit risk hypothesis (Benzion et al. 1989), delayed 
consequences are associated with an implicit risk value, and 
individuals require compensation for a change in their finan‑
cial position. According to Mary Stevenson (1986), Leonard 
Green and Joel Myerson (1996) and Myerson et al. (2003), 
Figure 1: Perception and its impact upon private-market equilibrium 
and social optimum (illustration: Miki Malul, Mosi Rosenboim and 
Tal Shavit).
Policy effect
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delaying rewards is risky because this increases the possibil‑
ity that something will prevent payment. Gideon Keren and 
Peter Roelofsma (1995) suggested that discounting occurs due 
to the uncertainty encapsulated in future payoffs. Specifically, 
they found that introducing external uncertainty has a similar 
effect on subject behaviour as did the effect of expanding time 
delays. In addition, Malul et al. (2010) found that there is a 
negative correlation between trust level and discount rate for 
postponed receipt.
4 Results
Analysis of the experimental results indicates that there are 
misperceptions concerning the southern and centre regions. 
These misperceptions found expression in all the parameters 
that were tested in the experiment.
In the second part we used real measurable parameters for the 
quality of the labour force (monthly wage and years of school‑
ing) and the business environment (crime per 1,000 residents). 
The participants received the nationally average parameter 
value and were asked to estimate the regional value. The re‑
sults indicate that, on average, the participants’ estimation for 
the centre is better than in the real world and the estimation 
for the parameter of the south (periphery) worse than in the 
real world. Most of these results (as shown in Table 1) are 
significant at the 5% level for a t‑test of the null hypothesis 
that the average perception equals the real‑world value. For 
example, whereas the real average monthly wage in the south 
was NIS 6,749, the perceived monthly wage is NIS 5,708 ac‑
cording to the southern participants and NIS 5,936 according 
to the centre participants. The real monthly wage in the cen‑
tre was NIS 8,734, according to the southern participants the 
perceived monthly wage was NIS 9,100 and according to the 
centre participants the monthly wage was NIS 9,441 Similarly, 
the results in Table 1 indicate that there are also misperceptions 
about the years of schooling (indicator for labour quality), 
and the crime level (indicator for the business environment).
We expected that each group would assess itself as better than 
what was found in the real world. The results presented in 
Table 1 indicate that, for all the measurable parameters, the 
southern participants evaluated themselves worse than the 
real‑world indicator, whereas the centre participants ranked 
themselves better than what was found in the real world. 
These results may indicate that perception by the participants 
in the southern region regarding their abilities and qualities 
were under‑perceived. If the workers in a firm do not believe 
in their products, then why should the consumers believe in 
the company’s products?
In the third part we asked the participants to scale the pro‑
duction‑factor qualities, infrastructure (roads and communica‑
tion), labour force quality (labour force and education) and 
business environment (personal security and general quality of 
business environment). We found that the perception by the 
participants from the centre of the factors in the south was 
significantly (except for road infrastructure) worse than the 
perceptions of the participants from the south (perception of 
themselves). We found no significant differences between the 
perception of the factors in the centre region by participants 
from the centre and the south (see Table 2). The t‑value (Sig.) 
Table 1: Production factors: Real vs. perceived values
Parameter Evaluator group Average perception of south (std) Average perception of centre (std)
Monthly wage South NIS 5,708*
(NIS 1,043 )
NIS 9,100
(NIS 1,386 )
Centre NIS 5,936*
(NIS 1,156 )
NIS 9,441*
(NIS 1,553 )
Real-world value NIS 6,749  NIS 8,734 
Years of schooling South 12.05*
(1.63)
18.68*
(1.62)
Centre 11.62*
(1.45)
15.02*
(1.26)
Real-world value 13.30 14.30
Crime South 64.9
(31.6)
55.2*
(20.6)
Centre 76.4*
(49.6)
56.7*
(18.9)
Real-world value 61 68
Note: (*) Significant at the 5% level for a t-test of the null hypothesis that average perception equals real-world value.
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is for the t‑test of the null hypothesis that the estimation of 
the factor is not different between the participants from the 
south and participants from the centre.
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the participants underestimate 
the quality of the production factors in the periphery region 
and overestimate the quality of the production factors in the 
centre (d > 1). The reason for this is not just an underestima‑
tion from the centre to the south, but also an underestimation 
of themselves by the southern participants.
In the last part we analysed the level of trust of the participants 
from the centre and the south in the population in the centre 
and the south. The trust was measured by a direct scale con‑
cerning the level of trust in each group and by their willingness 
to pay for the lottery.
Table 2: Production factor scaling
Parameter Evaluator group Average perception of south (std) Average perception of centre (std)
Road infrastructure South 3.73
(1.02)
5.05
(1.25)
Centre 3.55
(1.21)
5.02
(1.24)
t-value (Sig.) 0.72
(0.47)
0.12
(0.91)
Communication infrastructure  South 5.05
(1.13)
5.73
(0.99)
Centre 4.57
(1.28)
5.94
(0.99)
t-value (Sig.) 1.82
(0.07)
−0.95
(0.35)
General labour-force quality  South 4.62
(1.21)
5.78
(1.15)
Centre 4.11
(1.07)
5.85
(0.81)
t-value (Sig.) 2.04
(0.05)
−0.31
(0.76)
Education South 4.35
(1.42)
5.76
(1.21)
Centre 3.66
(1.31)
5.43
(1.12)
t-value (Sig.) 2.30
(0.02)
1.29
(0.20)
Personal safety
 
South 4.41
(1.36)
5.22
(1.13)
Centre 3.87
(1.54)
5.19
(1.11)
t-value (Sig.) 1.68
(0.10)
0.1
(0.92)
General human-resources quality South 4.68
(1.20)
5.51
(0.84)
Centre 4.06
(1.15)
5.66
(0.79)
t-value (Sig.) 2.36
(0.02)
−0.81
(0.42)
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In Table 3 we present the average trust the residents from each 
region had in residents of centre and in residents of the south. 
It seems that participants from the centre have lower trust in 
people from the south in relation to their trust in people from 
the centre; however, participants from the south have the same 
trust in the two groups. The average bidding price for the lot‑
teries reveals that participants from the centre are willing to 
pay a lower price for the lottery if the payer is a resident of 
the south. The participants from the south are willing to pay 
the same price for the lottery if the payer is from the south or 
from the centre. This is consistent with the trust level because 
lower trust in the lottery’s payer should lead to lower willing‑
ness to pay for this lottery.
The mistrust could lead to higher interest rates for the mis‑
trusted group, and subsequently a distorted allocation of capi‑
tal (Malul et al., 2010). Because the majority of the capital is 
concentrated in the core region, this might have a negative 
effect on the business environment in the periphery. We asked 
the participants to state the average monthly rate of return 
that they required for postponing receipt of payment for 
24 months. As mentioned previously, the participants were 
asked to state the amount (in NIS) they would be willing to 
accept (WTA) 24 months from today in order to postpone 
receipt of a fixed sum of NIS 1,000 they could receive today. 
In the first question the future payer would be a resident of 
the south and in the second question the future payer would 
be a resident of the centre.
For each participant we calculated the monthly interest 
rate he or she asked for the payment postponement as fol‑
lows: Assume WTA is the amount that participant i is will‑
ing to accept from the future payer 24 months from today 
in order to postpone the NIS  1,000 he or she was sup‑
posed to receive today. The average monthly return  (r) is: 
r = (WTA/1,000)(1/24) − 1. The participants from the centre 
asked on average for a 5.1% monthly return from a southern 
future payer and 4.8% from a future payer from the centre. 
Consistent with the perception differences and trust differ‑
ences, we find that the monthly return required from the 
southern payer is higher than the monthly return required 
from the payer from the centre (t‑value = 1.89, Sig. = 0.065).
5  Policy implication
The market failure stemming from the misperception of the 
“constant” by the firms (as reflected in the experimental re‑
sults) calls for policy intervention. The central government 
should “fix” the misperception effect mainly by marketing 
the periphery region by providing information regarding 
the current level of infrastructure and labour‑force quality 
in relation to the central region (Kotler et al., 1993; Van der 
Berg & Braun 1999). These marketing efforts should make the 
firms/entrepreneurs see the real gap between the amenities 
in the regions so that the perception distortion is eliminated. 
Due to the fact that misperceptions lead to a distortion in 
the allocation of economic activity, from a purely economic 
point of view, the central government should act in order to 
achieve efficiency in the economy. In practice, however, the 
central government should collaborate (or consult) with the 
regional governments of peripheral communities in order to 
effectively “fix” the effect of these misperceptions. The policy 
measures should enable the firms/entrepreneurs to see the 
score ZPA in the private market, thus leading to efficient al‑
location of the economic activity. Actually, the marketing ef‑
forts should discount the constant of region A seen by the   
firms/entrepreneurs in the free market by the ratio 1/d, thus 
eliminating this distorting effect. This should be done concur‑
rently with changing the infrastructure and labour‑force qual‑
ity so that, finally, ZPPA
G = ZPA, where ZPPA
G represents the 
private score of region A after government intervention. Thus, 
after the government intervention an efficient distribution of 
firms between the core and the periphery can be achieved. It is 
possible that the cost of achieving the efficient equilibrium (yp) 
will be relatively high compared to its efficiency. Therefore, the 
government should consider steering the economy toward y* 
where: yp < y* < ypp.
Table 3: Average trust level indicators
Parameter Evaluator group Average perception of 
south (std)
Average perception of centre (std) t-value (Sig.)
Trust scale South 4.53
(1.25)
4.30
(1.24)
1.16
(0.25)
Centre 3.96
(1.18)
4.66
(0.96)
4.22
(0.00)
Lottery South 174
(180)
167
(172)
−0.75
(0.46)
Centre 173
(190)
177
(188)
1.76
(0.08)
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6 Conclusion
The new economic geography analyses the equilibrium spa‑
tial distribution of economic activity between core and pe‑
riphery while considering economy and diseconomy of scale. 
Our questionnaire analysis shows that there is misperception 
in all of the parameters tested. The misperceptions regarding 
the quality of the labour force (monthly wage and years of 
schooling), quality of infrastructure (roads and communica‑
tion) and the business environment (general level of human 
resources quality, crime level and level of trust), which favoured 
the centre compared to the periphery, stem not just from an 
underestimation of the periphery but also a self‑underestima‑
tion by the southern participants themselves. We showed that 
the gap between the perceptions, which affect financial deci‑
sions such as interest rates and willingness to pay for risky 
assets, depends on whether the payer is from the south or from 
the centre. The questionnaire’s results validate the necessity of 
including the misperception effect in core‑periphery models.
In our theoretical model we showed that, when a mispercep‑
tion regarding the relative quality of the production factors 
between a core and peripheral regions exists, the free market 
fails to achieve an optimal allocation of the economic activity 
between the core and the periphery. Thus, a policy interven‑
tion is required in order to “fix” the distortion created by the 
misperception effect. The main policy measure that should be 
taken is marketing of the peripheral region (and also empower‑
ment of the southern population) in order to allow potential 
investors to perceive the real attributes of this region in rela‑
tion to the central region. This kind of policy might be help‑
ful in increasing the total welfare of the economy through 
improved allocation of economic activity between the core 
and the periphery.
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